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The degree of competition and level of price transmission in food markets have important 
effects on the welfare level of consumers and producers. Thus, substantial attention has 
been paid to the analysis of price transmission in food markets. Traditionally, price 
transmission analyses have focused on applying econometric methods to assess whether 
prices are cointegrated, the order of cointegration and the adjustment speed. In contrast, 
less attention has been devoted to the theoretical underpinnings, the structure of the market 
and the interpretation of results. To address this gap, this study explores how to combine 
industrial organization methods and time-series econometrics in price transmission 
analyses to inform policy choices. With this aim, this research uses a three-step approach. 
First, I employ industrial organization methods to analyse the structure of the milk market. 
Second, I use time-series econometrics to assess the price dynamics. Finally, I triangulate 
the different sources of information, bringing together the evidence derived from both 
analyses. The study illustrates the complementarity of these methods to gain a better 
understanding of the findings, to corroborate theoretical propositions and to advance 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The degree of competition and the level of price transmission in food markets have 
important effects on the welfare level of consumers and producers (Sexton and Lavoie, 
2001). Recent studies (Dawe et al., 2015; Dawe and Maltsoglou, 2014) stress the 
importance of deeply understanding the price dynamics of food markets in explaining the 
welfare effects of food policy measures. Current trends in mergers and acquisitions, 
coupled with increases in industry concentration have captured the attention of 
policymakers regarding the performance of food markets and the lack of transparency in 
the transmission of prices (McCorriston, 2013).  
In Panama, articles appeared in various newspapers in 2007 suggesting that processors 
agreed among themselves on the price of milk paid to producers, which highlighted the 
lack of transparency in the milk market, motivated the national antitrust authority to open 
an investigation against industrial processors over the alleged use of monopolistic practices. 
The investigation found that four major processors exchanged information that ultimately 
led them to agree on the purchase price of milk paid to producers. Dairy producers 
expressed their concerns about the competitiveness of the dairy supply chain, arguing that 
price changes are not being transmitted efficiently from global to domestic markets and 
between wholesalers and producers. In this context, this study assesses the efficiency level 
of Panama’s dairy market by examining the degree of spatial and vertical transmission of 
milk prices between global and domestic markets, as well as between wholesalers and small 
dairy producers.  
Substantial attention has been given to analysis of the level of price transmission in food 
markets during recent decades (for reviews see Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; 
Frey and Manera, 2007; Bakucs et al, 2014., Lloyd). Traditionally, price transmission 
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analysis has focused on applying econometric methods to assess if prices are co-integrated, 
the order of cointegration and the adjustment speed. However, less attention has been 
devoted to the theoretical underpinnings, the understanding of the market structure, and the 
interpretation of results (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Goodwin and Vavra 
(2009), in an overview of the empirical literature addressing vertical and spatial price 
transmission, highlight that the results of price transmission analysis are not sufficiently 
informative without a deeper understanding of the market structure relevant to the 
commodity in question. Moreover, Miller and Hayenga (2001) note that although 
economists have proposed many approaches for price transmission analyses, the 
econometric methods often used are limited because they cannot identify plausible 
explanations of price behaviour under competing theories.  
Acknowledgement of these issues has stimulated recent studies (Lloyd et al. 2004; 
Brümmer et al., 2009; Ihle et al., 2012; Götz et al., 2013) to incorporate the use of market 
structure information in price transmission analyses. This study takes this approach further 
by exploring how to combine industrial organization (IO) and econometric research 
methods for price transmission analysis to inform policy choices. With this aim, this 
research uses a three-step approach. First, we employ IO methods to analyse the structure 
of the milk market. Second, we use time-series econometrics to analyse the price dynamics. 
Finally, we triangulate the different sources of information to gain a better understanding 
of the interrelations among the factors that influence the transmission of prices, linking the 
evidence with theory.  
1.2 Objectives  
 Gain a deeper understanding of how the structure of markets and behaviour of agents 
affect the level of price transmission in food markets.  
 Explore how to combine industrial organization and time-series econometrics methods 
in price transmission. 
 Assess the extent and determinants of spatial and vertical price transmission in 




1.3 Price transmission analysis  
Price transmission analyses use different modifications of a model introduced by Granger 
(1981) and then extended by Engel and Granger (1987) based on cointegration theory. 
Cointegration theory stipulates that if the linear combination of nonstationary series is 
stationary, then the series are said to be cointegrated (Engel and Granger, 1987). A major 
aspect of cointegrated series is that their dynamics are affected by the degree of deviations 
from the long-run equilibrium relationship (Enders, 1998). This implies that a close 
relationship exists between cointegration and ECM, as suggested by Granger (1981). ECMs 
have been widely used in price transmission under the idea that a fraction of a disadjustment 
from one period is corrected in the next period (Engel and Granger, 1987). Studies have 
found that the transmission of food prices tends to be nonlinear, rather than linear 
(Hassouneh et al., 2012); indeed, the nonlinear transmission of prices seems to be the rule 
rather than the exception (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). In this regard, much 
of the research on price transmission has focused on capturing these nonlinearities 
(Kinnucan et al., 1987; Serra and Goodwin, 2002; Awokuse and Wang, 2009: Bolotova et 
al., 2012; McLaren, 2015).  
Following the concept of the non-symmetric ECM introduced by Granger and Lee (1989), 
von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) propose splitting the error correction term into positive and 
negative components to test for asymmetries in the transmission of prices, depending on 
whether they increase or decrease. As indicated by Abdulai (2000), under the presence of 
transaction costs, movement towards equilibrium does not always occur. Awokuse and 
Wang (2009) highlight that studies that ignore threshold effects in the transmission of prices 
may be misleading. To overcome this problem, studies have applied different modifications 
of threshold vector error correction models (TVECM)s as a way to incorporate the effects 
of transaction costs in price transmission analyses, allowing error correction specifications 
to adequately capture nonlinear and threshold-type price adjustments (Goodwin and Holt, 
1999; Serra and Goodwin, 2002; Balcome et al., 2007 Bekkerman et al., 2013).  
In recent years, regime-dependent vector error correction models (RVECMs) have received 
notable attention in the literature. According to Ihle et al. (2011) the parameters governing 
price interdependence might not be constant, indicating that if this characteristic is 
disregarded the model will be misspecified. Hassouneh et al. (2010) use a regime-switching 
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vector error correction model (RVECM) to assess the impact of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) outbreaks in the Spanish dairy sector and show that the BSE crises 
affected producer and retailer prices differently. Busse et al. (2012) employ a Markov-
switching vector error correction model (MS-VECM) to analyse changes in the relationship 
between diesel and biodiesel prices due to changes in market conditions. Amikuzuno and 
von Cramon-Taubadel (2012) apply a modification of the VECM with seasonally regime-
dependent adjustment parameters, showing that not accounting for seasonality can lead to 
compound estimates of the parameters that indicate price transmission behaviour but 
overlook seasonal differences in the price dynamics.  
1.4 The Panama milk market structure  
Each year, Panama produce around 206 million kg of fluid milk equivalent (FME), import 
112 million kg of FME, and export 22 million kg of FME. Thus, total availability of milk 
is about 296 million kg of FME. The dependency ratio is 38 per cent and the average 
consumption per capita is 77 litres per year.  
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As shown in Figure 1.1, there are about 6 630 milk producers, with 6 per cent producing 
Grade A milk, 4 per cent producing Grade B milk, and 90 per cent producing Grade C milk. 
From the 206 million kg the country produced in 2013, 46 per cent was Grade A, 6 per cent 
was Grade B and 48 per cent was Grade C. Grades A and B are used to supply the domestic 
market with fresh milk, while Grade C is used mainly for industrial purposes, the 
elaboration of traditional cheese and self-consumption at the farm level. From the entire 
domestic supply, 75 per cent goes to the industry, 15 per cent to traditional processors and 
the remaining 10 per cent is for household consumption. 
There are six major milk processing companies in the country. In 2013, the three biggest 
of these processors absorbed nearly 80 per cent of the supply oriented to the industrial 
market. During the last 10 years the dairy processing sector has experienced mergers and 
consolidations; for example, Coca-Cola FEMSA (Fomento Económico Mexicano S.A) 
from Mexico acquired Estrella Azul; the cooperative Dos Pinos from Costa Rica acquired 
Nevada; and the company Casa Luker from Colombia acquired Bonlac. These recent 
developments have led to changes in the structure of the market, not only due to the increase 
in the size of operations, but also because of the type of products they demand.  
Panama has traditionally been a net importer of dairy products. In 2013, the country 
imported about 112 million kg of FME units with a value of US$104 million. From total 
imports, in terms of value, cheese accounted for 53 per cent, milk powder for 26 per cent, 
butter for 8 per cent, whey for 6 per cent, yogurt for 5 per cent and fluid milk and cream 
for 3 per cent. The export of dairy products from Panama has been relatively low; in 2013, 
the country exported about 22 million FME units with a value of US$11.5 million; of this 
total 73 per cent was milk powder and 27 per cent was cheese. Due to tariff preferences 
obtained under the free trade agreement between Central America and Panama, dairy 
exports went mainly to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
1.5 Analytical framework  
This study explores how to combine industrial organization (IO) and econometric research 
methods in price transmission analysis. With this aim, this research uses a three-step 
approach (Figure 1.2). First, we employ IO methods to analyse the structure of the milk 
market. Second, we use time-series econometrics to assess the price dynamics. Third, we 
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triangulate the different sources of information. In the IO, the first step of analysis is to 
develop theoretical propositions to guide the data collection process, inform the design of 
the econometric model, and allow the study to link the empirical results with theory. 
Second, we map the supply chain to assess the structure of the market and identify the 
interlinkages between firms and the flow of products. Third, we collect evidence using 
various qualitative sources of information, including documentation, newspaper articles, 
semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions (Yin, 2013).  
Figure 1.2  Analytical framework 
Source: Author  
In the time-series econometric analysis, the first step is to determine if the series are 
stationary or nonstationary. Second, we employ the Johansen approach to test for 
cointegration (Johansen, 1991). Third, we apply different variations of error correction 
models (ECM), including the vector error correction models (VECM) and the asymmetric 
error correction models (AECM), to assess the price dynamics between global and domestic 
markets, as well as along the supply chain. Finally, in the triangulation phase, we bring 
together the evidence derived from both the industrial organization and the econometric 
analysis to better understand the interrelations among the factors that influence the 
transmission of prices, linking the empirical results with the theoretical propositions. 
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1.6 Chapter outlines 
1.6.1 Chapter 1: Introduction  
In this section I describe the problem’s relevance, an overview of the background 
knowledge, the context within which the research was done, the features of the analytical 
framework, and an outline of each chapter.  
1.6.2 Chapter 2: Spatial Price Transmission of Soaring Milk Prices from 
Global to Domestic Markets 
Milk has become one of the most volatile agricultural commodities in the international 
market. The high volatility of commodity prices and its implication for food security are 
clearly among the most important issues facing policy makers today. Thus, a deeper 
understanding of the magnitude, speed, and symmetry with which global milk prices are 
being transmitted to domestic prices at the farm gate level is a fundamental factor in the 
design of appropriate policy measures oriented to reduce not only the level of milk price 
volatility, but also poverty and food insecurity. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to 
assess the dynamics of the relationship between global and domestic milk prices.  
The results of the spatial price transmission analysis indicate that in Panama a long-run 
cointegration relationship exists between global and domestic prices; however, only 
producers’ prices show significant responses to price disequilibria. The output of the ECM 
shows that price swings in the global market are being transmitted to the domestic market 
but with a lower magnitude. Furthermore, the results of the AECM point out the potential 
presence of asymmetries in the transmission of milk prices from the global to the domestic 
market, indicating that increases in global prices tend to be transmitted faster to producers 
in Panama than decreases.  
The semi-structured interviews with importers reveal that milk powder is imported using 
an auction system open exclusively to those processors holding an import licence. The 
import volume represents nearly 50 per cent of the total volume of industrial milk that 
processors demand every year. The quota is divided into two main parts: the first part, 
equivalent to 70 per cent of the quota, is negotiated in November, but physically imported 
in January during the dry season; the second part, equivalent to 30 per cent of the quota, is 
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negotiated in May and internalized in July during the peak production season. However, if 
the international price is higher than the domestic price during the first term of the year, 
processors can request the government to allocate the full quota to the second term.  
1.6.3 Chapter 3: Vertical Price Transmission of Milk Prices:  Are Small 
Dairy Producers Efficiently Integrated into Markets? 
The dairy sector in Panama has undergone significant changes in recent years. For example, 
the dairy industry has experienced mergers and consolidations that have led to increases in 
industry concentration, a decrease in the number of producers, and an increase in the scale 
of operations. Dairy producers have expressed concerns about the competitiveness of the 
dairy supply chain, arguing that price changes are not being transmitted efficiently from 
wholesalers to producers. This issue has captured special attention from policy makers due 
to its implications for welfare distribution, hence the need for policy intervention. In this 
context, this chapter examines the degree of vertical price transmission between 
wholesalers and small dairy producers to assess the efficiency level of the dairy market 
chain in Panama.  
The result of the vertical price transmission analysis shows that a long-run single 
cointegration relationship exists between wholesalers’ and producers’ prices, where the 
direction of the price transmission tends to go from producers to wholesalers. A change in 
producers’ prices does not have a significant effect on wholesalers’ prices in the next 
period, and the speed at which prices tend to converge to fully correct for deviation is 
moderately slow. When producers’ prices increase, the speed of adjustment tends to be 
significantly faster than when prices decrease; in other words, the transmission of prices is 
asymmetric.  
The focus group discussion with producers reveals that in Panama milk prices increase 
during the dry season and decrease during the rainy season. Producers highlighted some of 
the factors that affect the level of price transmission: the presence of a large number of 
poorly organized dairy producers combined with a small number of well-articulated 
processors; a highly perishable product which restricts the geographic movement of raw 
milk; the fear of replacement or substitution by suppliers if they reduce their delivery quota; 
and a large proportion of fixed costs that prevent a reallocation of capital resources in the 
short run.  
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1.6.4 Chapter 4: Combining Industrial Organization and Econometric 
Methods in Price Transmission Analysis  
In Panama, the articles that appeared in various newspapers in 2007 suggesting that 
processors have agreed on the price of milk paid to producers, pointed out the lack of 
transparency in the milk market and motivated the national antitrust authority to open an 
investigation against industrial processors for the alleged use of monopolistic practices. 
The investigation found that four major processors exchanged information that ultimately 
led them to agree upon the purchase price of milk paid to producers. As a result, a fine was 
defined and an audit process established. 
This chapter explores how to combine the use of industrial organization (IO) and 
econometric methods for price transmission analysis. Based on the literature review the 
analytical framework is guided by the following four propositions: (1) the milk market 
structure is characterized by oligopsonistic competition; (2) oligopsonistic power dampens the 
degree of price transmission; (3) incomplete price transmission is associated with market power; 
(4) the price spread narrows when markets become more competitive. 
The results of the market structure analysis confirm the first proposition, highlighting that 
in Panama the milk market is characterized by an oligopsonistic structure constituted by 
six major processors and more than 6000 producers. The results of the VECM long-term 
parameter confirm our second proposition, indicating that in the long-run a change of 1 per 
cent in the wholesale price leads to a change of 0.45 per cent in the producer’s price. The 
results of the semi-structured interviews with the national antitrust authority corroborate 
our third proposition, highlighting that four processors where found guilty of having 
incurred in collusion practices to fix the price of milk paid to producers. The VECM policy 
change dummy variable confirm our four proposition, showing that after antitrust 
regulations were imposed the price spread between wholesalers and producers decreased 
from 18 per cent to 12 per cent.  
Finally, the results of the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions 
corroborate our four propositions, highlighting that the combination of a high level of 
market concentration at the industry level with an inelastic price supply function at the 




1.6.5 Chapter 5: Conclusions  
Finally, in this chapter, I present a summary of the main outcomes of the research, the 
conclusions of the papers written and published along the way; and the research’s main 
contribution. At the end of this section, I do a looking back and looking forward assessment, 
describing the major steps during my research process, what I have learned, some areas for 
potential improvement, and topics for future research in this field. 
1.7 Compilation of articles  
The three articles which form the core of this thesis are: 
- Acosta, A., Ihle, R., & Robles, M. 2014.  Spatial Price Transmission of Soaring Milk 
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doi:10.1002/agr.21358 
 
- Acosta, A. & Valdés, A. 2014. Vertical Price Transmission of Milk Prices: Are Small 
Dairy Producers Efficiently Integrated into Markets? Agribusiness, 30: 56 – 63. 
doi:10.1002/agr.21357   
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Chapter 2 Spatial Price Transmission of Soaring 
Milk Prices from Global to Domestic Markets 
Abstract  
Milk has become one of the most volatile agricultural commodities in the international market. 
High volatility of commodity prices and their implications for food security are clearly among 
the most important issues facing policy makers today. Thus, a deeper understanding of the 
magnitude, speed, and symmetry to which global milk prices are being transmitted to domestic 
prices at the farm gate level is a fundamental factor in the design of appropriate policy measures 
oriented to reduce not only the level of milk price volatility, but also poverty and food 
insecurity. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to assess the dynamics of the relationship 
between global and domestic milk prices.  
2.1 Introduction  
Milk has become one of the most volatile agricultural commodities in the world (IFCN, 2010) 
due to multiple independent phenomena affecting its availability and demand over a short 
period of time. According to FAO, the international market price of dairy products has doubled, 
halved, and doubled again over the last five years. For example, the FAO’s international index 
for dairy products increased 100 per cent between November 2006 and November 2007, when 
it reached a record value of 268, the most significant price spike in recent history (FAO, 2008).  
The causes of this spike were primarily attributed to the exhaustion of public stocks in the 
European Union and the sharp increase in feed prices in 2007 caused by short global supplies 
and high feed grain demand for biofuel (FAO, 2007).  However by the end of 2008, dairy prices 
started falling again at an accelerated rate, with the index reaching a value of 159 in November. 
This decrease was related to the increased availability of dairy products in the international 
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market, the value of the dollar, the melamine contamination of milk supplies in China, and 
especially the global economic crisis (FAO, 2008).  
After the marginal contraction in demand experienced in 2008, prices of dairy products jumped 
again in late 2009, and the index reached a value of 208 in November as speculation about 
other food crises and risk uncertainty led to stock retention, causing a 32 per cent  rise in 
November alone (FAO, 2009).  In addition, the contraction of supply from Oceania and lively 
import demand from Asia contributed to an upsurge in dairy prices experienced in 2010. 
Modest production response in exporting countries, unfavourable climate conditions, and 
policies such as those in the EU that limit output caused prices to jump again during the first 
quarter of 2011 (however, since the second quarter prices have trended downwards).   
This increase in price volatility is no longer perceived as a temporary phenomenon, but as the 
new trend of global markets (FAO, 2010). Such volatility has raised serious concerns, not only 
among producers and consumers but also among policy makers who are trying to design policy 
measures other than traditional market tools to lessen price swings (FAO, 2008). Among the 
structural factors that have contributed to the phenomenon of milk price volatility are: a) the 
strong influence that small changes of quantity in the milk market have on price; b) the slow 
speed of adjustment of domestic milk production as a result of price changes (low price 
elasticity of supply); c) the delayed reaction of demand to changing dairy commodity prices 
(low price elasticity of demand) and d) the weak vertical transmission of price signals from 
consumers to producers (FAO, 2010).  
Milk price volatility is causing different effects among countries and socioeconomic groups. 
On the one hand, milk soaring prices is benefiting net exporting countries and producers that 
react quickly to new market trends. On the other, it is negatively affecting net importing 
developing countries such as Panama by deteriorating their terms of trade. When international 
milk prices increase in countries like Panama, the cost of the food basket goes up, reducing the 
real income of net food buyers. However, when international milk prices decrease, the income 
of dairy producers — particularly that of small producers that compete with industrial milk 
quality — is seriously affected.   
Ensuring a competitive price level at the farm gate is one of the keys to agricultural growth and 
thus poverty reduction (Norton, 2004).  Therefore, a better understanding of the extent to which 
global milk prices are being efficiently transmitted to producers at the farm gate level is an 
important issue for the design of policy measures aimed at decreasing not only the level of 
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price volatility, but also poverty and food insecurity (Schroeder & Hayenga 1987). The 
purposes of this document are: i) to analyse if small dairy producers and global milk markets 
are integrated; ii) to estimate whether changes in global milk prices are being efficiently 
transmitted to small dairy producers’ prices at the farm gate level; and iii) to assess the 
dynamics of the relationship between global and domestic milk prices. 
2.2 Characteristics of the dairy trade market in Panama  
Panama entered the WTO in 1996 and negotiated a milk import quota of 12,000 metric tons 
per year of fluid milk equivalents. Prior to 1996, it maintained a dynamic milk production 
growth rate of 7.2% per year. However, after this period, milk production growth decreased 
drastically to an average rate of 1.3% per year. This sudden change has been partially explained 
by the fact that growth in demand came to be fulfilled through increments in import volumes 
rather than increased national production. As shown in table 2.1, in 2009 Panama produced 
about 168 million liters of fluid milk equivalents (FME), imported 130 million, and exported 
17 million. Thus the total availability of milk was about 281 million liters of fluid milk 
equivalents and the dependency ratio 46%. The average consumption per capita per year is 98 
liters. 
Table 2.1  Milk availability and consumption in Panama 2000 – 2009 (*Million liters) 
Description 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Production * 
 
153.8 152.5 155.6 158.2 154.8 160 159.7 164.2 164.5 168.5 
Imports* 
 
102.3 96.1 97.5 103.1 84.4 123.4 110.6 127.6 164.5 130.2 
Exports* 
 
24.8 25.4 27.1 17.1 22 25 18.7 17.7 21.8 17.4 
Apparent demand* 
 
231.3 223.2 226 244.2 217.2 258.4 251.6 274.1 307.2 281.3 
Consumption Lt/cap 77 72.9 72.4 76.8 67.1 78.4 75 80.3 88.5 79.7 
Dependency ratio (%) 44.2 43.1 43.1 42.2 38.9 47.8 44 46.6 53.5 46.3 
Source: Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario de Panamá (2011); Contraloría General de la Republica 
(2011) 
Panama has traditionally been a net importer of dairy products. In 2009, the total quantity of 
imports was about 17 million liters, with a value of 62 million dollars. Ninety per cent of these 
imports consist of raw materials used for industrial purposes such as whole milk powder, skim 
milk powder, and cheddar cheese. The remaining 10% is used for finished products such as 
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fluid milk, evaporated milk, condensed milk, and fresh cheese.  Most imports of milk products 
come from Oceania.  
The dairy import market in Panama is characterized by a high level of nominal protection. The 
dairy product with the highest import duty is evaporated milk, with an average tariff of 155%, 
followed by fluid milk with a tariff of 60%, and milk powder with a tariff of 50%. The import 
tariff applied to other dairy products ranges from zero to 30%.   However since most of the 
dairy products imported come either from the WTO tariff rate quota or are entered under the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff scheme, the real tariffs applied to dairy imports are 
significantly lower than the nominal rate. In fact, statistics from the National Customs 
Authority shows that the average import duties applied to dairy products in 2008, 2009, and 
2010 were 5.7%, 7.4% and 6.2% respectively. (FAO, 2012). 
The export of dairy products in Panama is very limited, accounting less than 18 million liters 
in 2009. Due to tariff preferences obtained with the signature of the Free Trade Agreement, 
about 90% of Panama’s dairy exports are sold to Central American countries. During 2009 
dairy exports went to Costa Rica (68%), Honduras (10%), Guatemala (9%), Nicaragua (8%), 
and El Salvador (5%). In terms of the total value, most of these exports were in the form of 
cheese (42%), evaporated milk (34%), and condensed milk (24%) (CGR, 2011). 
2.3 Spatial price transmission analysis  
Spatial price transmission refers to the process based through which markets for a 
homogeneous commodity at spatially separated locations share long-run information (McNew, 
1996; Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). Spatial price transmission has been widely analysed in the 
context of the “Law of One Price” which hypothesizes that if two markets are linked by trade 
and are efficient, the price differential between them is equal to the cost of carrying out trade 
between them (transaction costs) (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). Prices are consequently 
thought of being connected by a stable long-run equilibrium, with attraction forces of this 
equilibrium resulting in the correction of temporal deviations that occur due to supply or 
demand shocks. Therefore, a proportional increase in the international price of an agricultural 
commodity will lead to an equally proportional increase of its price in domestic markets, at all 
points in time, assuming markets are perfectly integrated (Mundlak and Larson, 1992). In this 
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context, price transmission analysis measures the extent and the speed to which price shocks 
are transmitted between spatially separated locations (Amikuzuno 2009). 
According to Rapsomanikis et al. (2003), the notion of price transmission can be better 
understood as being based on three main components: 1) co-movement and completeness of 
adjustment, 2) dynamics and speed of adjustment, and 3) asymmetry of response.  Co-
movement and completeness of adjustment entails that a change in the price of an agricultural 
commodity in one market is reflected in the price change of the commodity in other markets. 
Dynamics and speed of adjustment relates to the process and rate at which changes in prices in 
one market are transmitted to other markets. Asymmetry of response refers to the process in 
which transmission differs according to whether the prices are increasing or decreasing (von 
Cramon-Taubadel 1998; Prakash 1999; Balcome and Morrison 2002; Rapsomanikis et al 2003; 
Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 2004).  
The literature on spatial price transmission has dealt with various factors that constrain the 
pass-through of price signals from one market to another (see Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 
2004 for an overview). For better understanding, we classify these factors into three main 
groups: transaction costs, trade policies, and market power. 
- Transaction costs: In many cases, particularly in developing countries where infrastructure 
is of poor quality, transaction costs are markedly increased or prohibitively high. In 
combination with deficient communication services, this results in, high transport costs that 
make arbitrage expensive and links markets insufficiently (Abdulai 2000; Conforti 2004); 
 
- Trade policies: Import tariffs, tariff rate quotas, export subsidies, export taxes, and 
exchange rate policies can isolate domestic markets and obstruct the full transmission of 
international price signals. The higher tariff levels are, the closer domestic prices will be to 
autarky and the less international price changes will be transmitted to national markets 
(Rapsomanikis et al. 2003, Conforti, 2004); 
 
- Market power: Imperfect competition due the concentration of market power on actors at 
one or more levels of the supply chain might result in an incomplete, low, and asymmetric 
pass-through of prices. This implies higher price differences between markets than can be 




Most of the models applied to analyse spatial price transmission are based on the log-linear 
regression model (1) used by Mundlak and Larson (1992) to assess the relationship between 
international and domestic prices.  This work was criticized and proved wrong by Quiroz and 
Soto (1995).  Furthermore, Ardeni (1989) has argued that many of the previous studies 
conducted in the area of market integration and price transmission were unreliable, and that 
most of the evidence presented to support the assumption that commodity prices are 
cointegrated in the long-run was flawed and affected by spurious regressions, non-stationary 
series, or inappropriate use of first differences.  In order to deal with these econometric 
shortcomings, he proposed a new methodological alternative approach based on cointegration 
theory.  
Balcombe et al. (2007) pointed out that regular cointegration approaches often ignore the 
important role played by transaction costs. They assume a linear relationship between prices 
that are inconsistent with discontinued trade and possesses weak power to discriminate between 
integrated and independent markets. Furthermore, Goodwin and Piggot (2001) have 
highlighted that transaction costs may result in a neutral band within which markets are well 
integrated even though prices are not directly linked. Acknowledgment of the importance of 
this issue has led to the application of new empirical approaches that explicitly recognize the 
influence of transaction costs on spatial price transmission. On this subject, several authors 
(Abdulai, 2000; Balcombe, 2007, Goodwin, 2001) have found threshold vector error correction 
models (TVECM) sufficient to examine spatial price transmission issues taking into account 
transaction costs. 
Nevertheless, as indicated by Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel (2004), a major shortcoming in 
TVECM models is that they are based on the assumption that transaction costs are constant — 
an assumption that is not valid in Panama, since transaction costs in the milk market change 
constantly depending on factors such as the level of the import duty and size of the import 
quota. In this regards, Acosta (2012) found the use Asymmetric Error Correction Models 
(AECM) to be a good alternative econometric approach to conduct a spatial price transmission 
analysis when transaction cost is not constant.  
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2.4 Econometric methods  
Regressions involving nonstationary time-series will produce spurious results showing a 
significant relationship between variables that appear correlated, but not related to each other. 
Therefore, the first step in our price transmission analysis was to determine whether the time-
series contained a unit root. However, the reliability of a unit root test is highly dependent on 
the selection of a model that mimics the actual data generation process, since the critical values 
of the t-statistics are influenced by whether or not an intercept and/or any time trend is included 
in the regression equation.  The addition of an extra parameter reduces the degree of freedom, 
thus making the power of the unit root test go to zero and leading to misspecification errors 
(Type I error) in which the null hypothesis of unit roots is wrongly rejected (Enders 2005). 
Therefore, in order to determine whether or not to include a deterministic element in the 































The first equation (2.1) was an unrestricted model that included both an intercept and a linear 
time trend. For the second equation (2.2), we restricted the trend. The third equation (2.3) was 
a random walk model that restricted both the trend and the intercept chosen (Dickey and Fuller 
1979, 1981 quoted by Enders 2005). Afterwards, an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test was 
used to test for unit roots.  Given that all the time-series analysed were non-stationary, and 
taking co-integration theory into account (which says that two or more non-stationary series 
are long-term cointegrated if both series are integrated of the same order and their linear 
combination yields a disturbance term that is stationary), we followed a Johansen (1991) 





Taking into account that both of the time-series analysed were cointegrated, we estimated an 
Asymmetric Vector Error Correction Model (AVECM) in order to shed light on the 
interdependencies of both prices. We followed the two-step approach proposed by Engel and 
Granger (1987) to capture the short-term effects, and the speed of adjustment at which a 
dependent variable returns to equilibrium after a change in an independent variable. However, 
we adapted it by modifying the first step and estimating the long-run price equilibrium by using 
Johansen’s (1991) reduced rank regression, since it was shown to be superior in most contexts 
by Gonzalo (1994). In the first step, we estimated equation (2.4) regressing producer prices 
(PP) on global prices (GP) to obtain an estimate of the residuals (ect), which quantify the 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium often referred to as error correction terms. As a 
second step, we estimated equation (2.5) regressing P on lags of itself, and P and the lagged 
equilibrium errors (ect).  
ttt ectGPPP  10   (2.4) 
tjt
j
jtt pectp    1
 
(2.5) 
The coefficient   capture the short-term effects of the lags of the changes of both prices 
)'( ttt PPGPp   on  Panama price movements in the current period, and   quantifies the rate 
at which the domestic prices adjust equilibrium deviations after a shock — in other words, the 
error correction term (ect). 
tjt
j








Finally we follow the approach proposed by von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) and test for 
asymmetries in the transmission of price signals. The AVECM, denoted in (2.6), is obtained 
by splitting the error correction term 1tect  into its positive and negative parts so that a separate 
evaluation of responses to non-negative (

1tect ) and negative (

1tect ) deviations from the long-
run equilibrium becomes possible. This allows one to identify whether the speed at which 
prices are transmitted differ, depending on the direction of the price changes — in other words 
whether price transmission is asymmetric. 
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2.5 Data  
The spatial price transmission analysis was conducted using 144 monthly price observations 
over the period 2000 (1) to 2011 (12). Figure 2.1 presents the plot of the data. For the domestic 
market we used producer monthly milk price observations at the farm gate level reported by 
the Contraloria General de la Republica in Panama. For the international market, we used 
F.O.B. Oceania whole milk powder monthly prices reported by the USDA Dairy Market News. 
For comparison purposes, fluid milk producer prices were transformed into whole milk powder 
prices using a conversion factor of 8.3, as suggested by Angeles-Montiel et al (2004).  
Figure 2.1  Global and domestic milk prices  
Source:  International whole milk powder prices (Oceania, indicative F.O.B export prices ) reported 
by the United States Department of Agriculture Dairy Market News (USDA, 2012); and  Producers 
fluid milk monthly prices at the farm gate reported by Contraloría the General de la Republica de 
Panamá (CGRP, 2012).  
2.6 Results  
The model specification procedure facilitated the identification of the equation that best 
simulates the data generating process.  The output (Table 2.2) indicates that for the Producer 
Price (PP) model, the coefficients associated with the constant ( 0a ) and trend parameter ( 2a ) 
are significant at the 5 per cent  level, suggesting that adding these two variables to the equation 


































































































































































test statistic (14.02), a result that is superior to the critical value of F (1.120) at the 1 per cent  
level (6.85).  
On the other hand, the regression results of the Global Price (GP) model shows that the 
coefficient of the constant parameter is significant at the 5 per cent level, whereas the 
coefficient of the trend parameter is not — results that are confirmed by the value of the F-test 
(3.93) which is inferior to the critical value of the F-test at the 1 per cent level, suggesting that 
the addition of the time trend parameter does not significantly improve the explanatory power 
of the model.  
Table 2.2  Model specification  
Model 
0a  2a  
  








































Source: Authors  
In order to test for the presence of unit roots, an Augmented Unit Root Test (ADF) was used 
(Table 2.3). The optimal number of lags was determined using the Schwarz Criterion 
information criteria. The outputs of the unit root tests indicate that for both variables there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of unit roots at the 5 per cent  level, suggesting 
that both series appear to be non-stationary processes and integrated of order one.   
Table 2.3  Unit Root Tests  
Variable Lags 0: Ho  Lags 0: Ho
 
critical values at 5% level 
PP 
 
3 -3.27 7 -11.59 -3.41 
GP 1 -1.84 0 -6.98 -2.86 
Source: Authors  
Considering that both series are I (1) processes, a Johansen Trace Test was used to determine 
if the time-series are cointegrated, that is, whether they share a long-run equilibrium. It is 
unlikely that there will be a trend in the cointegrating relationship between the series. Thus we 
assume that the models contain an intercept, but not a time trend. The results of the Johansen´s 
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Test (Table 2.4) indicate that there is strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration between GP and PP, suggesting that a long-run cointegration relationship exists 
between global and producer prices.   
Table 2.4  Johansen Trace Test  
Variable Lags Ro LR P-Value critical values at 5% level 
 
GP 2 0 51.49 0.00 24.69 
 
PP 0 1 4.24 0.38 12.53 
Source: Authors  
The output of the ECM in equation (2.7) shows the existence of a long-run equilibrium between 
global and domestic milk prices, however it also indicates that prices changes in global market 
are buffered in the domestic market, since the coefficient of tGP  is smaller than unity.  
ttt ectGPPP  605.01175
    
(2.7) 
The results of the AECM (equation 2.8) illustrate first, that only producer prices respond to 
disequilibria, since both coefficients of the global price are not significant at the 5% level. 
Second, the producer price reacts faster to positive disequilibria than to negative ones. Third, 
the correction of price disequilibria is of a very strong magnitude and coefficients are of the 
correct sign. Hence, a stretched margin tect  which can either be caused by increased domestic 
prices or decreased global prices is transmitted to producers faster than squeezed margins tect  




































































































































The results point to pronounced asymmetry, where trade institutions and trade infrastructure 
(which link domestic Panamanian producers to the global market) transmit decreases in global 
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market prices faster to producers than they transmit global market increases. However, an F-
test on the hypothesis that the coefficients of the responses to positive and negative 
disequilibria do not differ significantly (that is, that there is no asymmetry) and could not be 
rejected at the 5% level since the test statistic of 1.55 is considerably smaller than the critical 
value of 3.84. The analysis therefore provides no robust statistical evidence for asymmetry in 
price responses although the numerical estimates differ considerably. 
Finally, the semi-structured interviews with importers reveal that milk powder is imported 
using an auction system open exclusively to those processors holding an import license. The 
import volume represents nearly 50 per cent of the total volume of industrial milk that 
processors demand every year. The quota is divided into two main parts: the first part, 
equivalent to 70 per cent of the quota, is negotiated in November, but physically imported in 
January during the dry season; the second part, equivalent to 30 per cent  of the quota, is 
negotiated in May and internalized in July during the peak production season. However, if the 
international price is higher than the domestic price during the first term of the year, processors 
can request the Government to allocate the full quota to the second term. The results of the 
semi-structure interviews suggest that the import quota mechanism is obstructing a more 
complete and symmetric transmission of internal price signals.  
2.7 Conclusion  
The findings of the econometric analysis indicate that a long-run cointegration relationship 
exists between global and domestic producers’ prices, however only producers prices show 
significant responses to price disequilibria, which appears to be plausible due to the relative 
sizes of both markets. The output of the ECM shows that price swings in global market are 
being transmitted to domestic markets in Panama, but with a lower magnitude. Furthermore, 
the results of the AECM point out the potential (although statistically weak evidence) presence 
of asymmetric price transmission of global and domestic milk prices, indicating that increases 
in global prices tend to be transmitted faster to producers than decreases. The results of the 
semi-structure interviews suggest that the import quota mechanism is obstructing a more 
complete and symmetric transmission of price signals from international to domestic markets. 
Based on these results, we conclude that a large part of producer´s milk prices changes in 
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Chapter 3 Vertical Price Transmission of Milk 
Prices:  Are Small Dairy Producers Efficiently 
Integrated into Markets? 
Abstract 
In recent years the dairy sector in Panama has experienced mergers and consolidations that 
have led to increases in industry concentration, a decrease in the number of producers, and an 
increase in the scale of operations. Small dairy producers have expressed concerns about the 
competitiveness of the dairy supply chain, arguing that price changes are not being transmitted 
efficiently from wholesalers to producer at the farm gate level. In this context, this chapter 
examines the degree of vertical price transmission between wholesalers and small dairy 
producers to assess the efficiency level of the dairy market chain in Panama. The findings  of 
this research provide original and important contributions to the policy dialogue uncovering 
two key issues : i) an unidirectional transmission of milk prices from producers to wholesaler, 
and ii) that the transmission of milk prices is asymmetric depending on whether prices are 
increasing or decreasing.  
3.1 Introduction  
The dairy sector in Panama has undergone significant changes in recent years. For example, 
the dairy industry has experienced mergers and consolidations that have led to increases in 
industry concentration, a decrease in the number of producers, and an increase in the scale of 
operations. Dairy producers have expressed concerns about the competitiveness of the dairy 
supply chain, arguing that price changes are not being transmitted efficiently from wholesalers 
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to producers. This issue has captured special attention from policy makers due to its 
implications on welfare distribution, hence the need for policy intervention.  
Price is the main instrument by which different levels of the market are linked (Serra & 
Goodwin, 2002). Thus, ensuring adequate price signals at the farm gate is fundamental to 
agricultural growth and productivity and consequently, to poverty reduction (Norton, 2004).  
A better understanding of the extent to which wholesalers’ prices are being efficiently 
transmitted down to producers at the farm gate level is an important issue for the design of 
policy measures that seek not only to reduce the causes of market failure in order to increase 
competitiveness, but also to reduce poverty and food insecurity (Schroeder & Hayenga, 1987).  
Figure 3.1- Milk price trends at producer and wholesaler levels 
Source: Authors based on Contraloría General de la República de Panamá, 2012 
In this context, this paper serves several purposes: i) to analyse if wholesalers’ (WP) and 
producers’ (PP) milk prices are cointegrated; ii) to estimate whether changes in wholesalers’ 
milk prices are being efficiently transmitted to producers prices at the farm gate level; and iii) 

















3.2 Structure of the milk market in Panama   
In economic terms, cattle production is one of the most important activities of the agricultural 
sector in Panama (accounting for 19.6% of agricultural GDP in 2009), followed in weight by 
other subsectors such as tropical fruits (18.7%), poultry (18.5%), cereals (16.4%), vegetables 
(9.8%), pigs (6.8%), and forestry (6.6%).  According to the 2011 Agricultural Census, Panama 
has about 40,000 farms with an inventory of 1.7 million head. Of this total, 48% are small 
farms of less than 20 hectares, which manage 13% of the national herd with an average of 11 
head per farm (CGR, 2011).  
Table 3.1  Cattle inventory breakdown in Panama 









Small 48% <20 13% 11 
Medium 47% 20-199 55% 45 
Large 5% >200 32% 294 
Source: CGR, 2011 
The largest part of the cattle production system in Panama is concentrated along the pacific 
coast, which has the most fertile soil in the country. The area under pasture in these provinces 
ranges from 72% in Los Santos, to 53% Herrera, 47% in Chiriquí, 28% in Coclé and 26% in 
Veraguas. During the last decade, Panama has observed a 13% increase in the size of its herd, 
with an average growth rate of 2.1% per year, passing from 1.5 million head in 2000 to 1.7 
million in 2010. This increase is particularly remarkable in the Darién province, where the 
number of animals has risen from 29,000 head in 2000 to 198,900 in 2010 a growth of 585% 
over a ten-year period. 
There are three main cattle production systems in Panama: one specialized in milk, a second 
specialized in meat, and a third that consists of a dual-purpose system producing both milk and 
meat. The dual-purpose system is the most prevalent among small producers (located mainly 
in the lowlands, particularly in Los Santos, Herrera, and Veraguas), and is based on the 
crossbreeding of Bos-Inducus and Bos-Taurus breeds such as Zebu and Brown Swiss, or Zebu 
and Holstein.  
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According to FAO (2012), small dairy producers in Panamá constitute nearly 90% of total dairy 
producers, and contribute with 54% of the total fluid milk production in the country. This 
system is characterized by the lack of dairy infrastructure, limited use of technology, poor 
adoption of best production practices, and low productivity with an average production of milk 
per day of 4.8 liters per cow. Livestock feeding problems occur in Panama during the dry 
season due to lack of fodder. As a consequence, the milk production system remains highly 
seasonal and dependent on the rainfall regime. The high production period occurs during the 
rainy season (between May and November) and the low production period occurs during the 
dry season (from December to April).  Milk is classified in three main groups A, B, and C 
depending on its quality. Of the 168 million liters of milk produced annually in Panama, 46% 
corresponds to grade A, 4% to grade B, and 50% to grade C. Grade A is used exclusively for 
production of pasteurized fluid milk, while grades B and grade C are mainly used for industrial 
purposes (FAO, 2012). 
The dairy industry encompasses six large companies, among which are NESTLÉ Panama, 
Industrias Lácteas S.A (Estrella Azul), Refrescos Nacionales, Productos Lácteos San Antonio 
S.A (PROLACSA), Sociedad de Alimentos de Primera S.A (BONLAC), and Cooperativa de 
Productores de Leche de Chiriquí (COOLECHE). In 2009, this group of companies purchased 
88% of the national milk production. As the type of product that each industry manufactures 
determines the quality of milk they purchase, NESTLÉ and PROLACSA, which produce 
condensed milk and milk powder and manufacture a variety of cheeses, purchase mainly milk 
grade C.  Companies such as BONLAC and Estrella Azul focus on the commercialization of 
pasteurized fluid milk, and mainly purchase grade A. In addition to these large companies, 
there are 46 small and medium dairy plants specialized in the manufacture of cheese, yogurt, 
and milk sweets. These companies together adsorb the remaining 12% of the national milk 
production, and are becoming increasingly important players in the market. This tendency is 
particularly relevant for small dairy producers since most of small dairy plants purchase their 
inputs from small dairy farmers. 
According to FAO (2012), some of the factors constraining the development of the dairy sector 
in Panama are related to the lack of coordination between the public and private sectors in 
defining a national policy that would promote an increase in the competitiveness and 
sustainability of the sector. Such a national policy should pay close attention to strengthening 
the organizational capacities of small dairy producers associations, improving the public 
extension system (ensuring a sufficient number of well-trained technicians with specific 
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knowledge about good dairy production practices, including nutrition, genetics, and pastures 
management) and further developing infrastructure such as roads, electricity, and marketing 
mechanisms in production areas.  
3.3 Vertica price transmission analysis  
Vertical price transmission analysis can be used to assess how efficiently different actors are 
integrated in a market. The extent and speed with which price changes are transmitted from 
one actor to the other in the market chain can have important policy implications for welfare 
distribution, competitiveness, and sustainability.  In a competitive market, price shocks at one 
level of the market chain should be reflected by similar changes at the other levels, as market 
efficiency suggests a price equilibrium relationship between them (Serra & Goodwin, 2002). 
Depending on the environment in which markets operate, two prices can be related in various 
ways: (i) adjusting completely or partially, (ii) slowly or instantaneously and (iii) in a linear or 
in a non-linear manner (Ihle et al., 2009). In recent years, an extensive amount of studies have 
been developed to examine market linkages among farm, wholesale, and retail markets 
(Kinnucan & Forker, 1987; Schroeder & Hayenga, 1987; Goodwin & Holt, 1999; Miller & 
Hayenga, 2001; Serra & Goodwin, 2002). The main focus of research in this area has been 
oriented to assessing the nature, extent of adjustment, and speed with which shocks are 
transmitted along the different actors in the market chain. In these studies, the rate of price 
response is generally measured through the lag relationship between upstream and downstream 
price, while the asymmetry of price response is measured as the relative response of 
downstream prices as upstream prices rise or fall (Miller & Hayenga, 2001). 
Most of the literature on vertical price transmission refers to non-competitive markets as the 
main cause of incomplete price transmission.  The factors that constrain the complete and 
symmetric transmission of agricultural commodity prices from one market to another are 
classified into: : (i) market power concentration at levels beyond the farm gate; ii) different 
costs of adjustment when firms change the quantities and/or prices of inputs and/or outputs; iii) 
government intervention in the pricing of agricultural products; iv) imperfect information; v) 
different price elasticities at different levels of the market chain; and vi) the presence of rapidly 
perishable goods (Kinnucan & Foker, 1987; Goodwin & Holt, 1999: Meyer & von Cramon-
Taubadel, 2004; Serra & Goodwin,  2002).   
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Existing models that analyse vertical price transmission issues utilize several variations of a 
model originally introduced by Wolffram, (1971) and later modified by Houck (1977) (Acquah 
& Dadzie, 2010). These models are based on the regression of differentiated price data and on 
lagged price differences where considerations can be made for the differential effects of 
positive and negative lagged differences (Goodwin & Holt, 1999). Many of these models have 
been criticized for being unreliable, since most of the evidence presented to support the 
assumption that commodity prices were cointegrated was flawed and affected by spurious 
regressions, non-stationary series, or inappropriate use of first differences (Ardeni, 1989). In 
order to deal with these econometric shortcomings, Engel & Granger (1987) proposed a new 
and alternative methodological approach based on cointegration theory, which indicates that 
two nonstationary time-series could be long-term cointegrated if both series are integrated of 
the same order.  
An initial attempt to use cointegration techniques in testing for asymmetric price transmission 
was von Cramon-Taubadel’s (1998) two-step method approach based on Engel & Granger to 
test for Asymmetric Price Transmission (APT) in the presence of nonstationary series using an 
Asymmetric Error Correction Model (AECM). In this approach, the authors proposed splitting 
the error correction term into positive and negative components to identify if prices are 
transmitted differently depending on whether they increase or decrease. Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel (2004) pointed out several methodological issues that need to be carefully 
considered when conducting price transmission analysis, since they can affect results: i) the 
problem of multicollinearity, ii) the presence of structural breaks, iii) the issue of data 
frequency, iv) adjustment cost, and v) the need for a better and deeper understanding of the 
underlying causes of asymmetric price transmission. 
3.4 Data  
The price transmission analysis was conducted using 252 monthly observations from January 
1991 to December 2011 at the wholesaler and small dairy producer level in Panama.  
Observations refer to nominal prices of fresh milk per liter.  The source of the data is the 
Contraloría General de la República de Panamá.  
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3.5 Econometric methods  
As previously discussed, regressions involving nonstationary time-series will produce spurious 
results showing a significant relationship between variables that are not correlated. Therefore, 
the first step in our vertical price transmission analysis was to determine whether the time-
series contained a unit root or not. Given that series were non-stationary, and following 
cointegration theory, we employed the Johansen approach to test for cointegration.  Then we 
applied the Granger Causality test to assess the possible direction of the price transmission.    
Taking into account that the series were cointegrated, we followed a Two-Step Error Correction 
Model (ECM) to capture the short-and long-term effects of X on Y, and the speed of adjustment 
at which a dependent variable returns to equilibrium after a change in an independent variable. 
Thus, as a first step we estimated equation (3.1) regressing Y on X to obtain an estimate of Z 
by taking the residuals from the regression.  
ttt zxy  10   (3.1) 
10120   ttt zxy   
(3.2) 
tttt ECTxy    10120  (3.3) 
As a second step, we estimated equation (3.2), regressing ty on 1 tx  plus the equilibrium 
errors represented by 1tz . This equation can be represented as a basic structure of an ECM   
(3.3) where 2  captures the short term effects of X on Y,  and   captures the rate at which the 
system adjusts to the equilibrium after a shock, in other words, the error correction term (ECT). 




 121112110  (3.4) 
Finally, following the approach proposed by von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1996) to test for 
asymmetric price transmission, we split the error correction term (ECT) into positive and 
negative deviation from long-run equilibrium. As shown in equation (3.4) splitting the ECT 
into positive and negative components allows one to identify if the speed at which prices are 
transmitted differs depending on whether prices are increasing or decreasing or in other words, 
if price transmission is symmetric or asymmetric. 
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3.6 Results  
In order to test for the presence of unit roots, we used an Augmented Unit Root Test (ADF) for 
the variables PP and WP. Taking into account potential autocorrelation problems, the number 
of optimal lags was determined using the Akaike information criteria. The results of the unit 
root tests (Table 3.2) indicate that for the PP and WP variables, there is insufficient evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis of unit roots at the five per cent level. 
Table 3.2  Unit Root Test  
Variable Test Lags 0: Ho  Lags 0: Ho  t-statistics critical values 
at 5% level 
PP ADF 8 -3.11 7 -6.98 -3.41 
WP ADF 2 -2.24 1 -16.44 -2.86 
Source: Authors  
Considering that the PP and WP are nonstationary series integrated of the same order, a 
Johansen Trace Test was used to determine if the variables are long-run cointegrated. The 
results of the Johansen’s Test (Table 3.3) indicate that there is strong evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of non-cointegration between WP and PP, suggesting the existence of a long-run 
single cointegration relationship between wholesalers’ and producers’ prices.  
Table 3.3  Johansen Trace Test  
Variable Lags Ro LR P-Value t-statistics critical values at 5% 
level 
WP 9 0 27.75 0.003 20.16 
PP  1 1.89 0.794 9.14 
Source: Authors  
In order to assess the possible direction of price transmission, we applied a Granger Causality 
Test.  As shown in table 3.4, we can reject the null hypothesis that producers’ milk prices do 
not cause wholesalers’ prices (P<0.05) but not inversely.  The result of the Granger causality 
test shows that the direction of price transmission tends to go from producers to wholesalers. 
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Table 3.4  Granger Causality Test  
Null Hypothesis F-Statistics Prob. 
PP does not cause WP 3.97 0.02 
WP does not cause PP 2.81 0.06 
Source: Authors  
We specified a two steps single equation error correction model (ECM) to assess the dynamics 
of the relationship between the different price series. The ECM allowed us to capture the short-
term effect that a shock in the independent variables has on the dependent variable and the 
speed at which the system will adjust to the new equilibrium after the shock. The result of the 
Granger causality test indicates that in the setting of an ECM, the series WP should be on the 
















  (3.5) 
The output of the ECM (3.5) indicates that while the coefficient (-0.091) of the error correction 
term  is significant at the 5% level (-2.535), the coefficient (-0.121) of the short term 
parameter   is not (-1.94). This result suggests that wholesaler’s and producer’s prices share 
a long-term equilibrium relationship, that a change in producer´s prices do not have a 
significant effect on wholesaler´s  prices in the next period, and that the speed at which prices 
tend to converge to fully correct for deviation is moderately slow. Taking into account the 
previous results, we constructed an Asymmetric Error Correction Model (AECM) to assess if 
the transmission of milk price between producers and wholesalers is symmetric or asymmetric, 
in other words if there are significant differences in the speed of adjustment when prices 



















045.0328.0159.0422.0007.0  (3.6) 
The result of the AECM (3.6) indicates that while the coefficient of the 
ECT (-0.328) is 
significant at the 5% level (-2.36), the coefficient of the ECT  (-0.045) is not (1.0). This  output 
reveals that the transmission of milk prices is asymmetric with respect to the speed of 
adjustment indicating that when producers´ prices increase the speed of adjustment tend to be 
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significantly faster, but when prices decrease there are not statistically significant changes in 
the speed of adjustment.   This result contrasts with the findings of Serra and Goodwin (2002), 
which found that the transmission of prices is reasonably symmetric in the Spanish dairy sector. 
However, it is consistent with findings from Kinnucan and Forker (1987) that confirmed the 
presence of asymmetric vertical price transmission in the U.S. dairy sector.  
Finally, the focus group discussions with producers identify that some of the factors that might 
be affecting the level of efficiency of the milk market are related to: the presence of a large 
number of poorly organized dairy producers combined with a small number of well-articulated 
industrial processors, leading to the low bargaining power of dairy producers; a perishable 
product which restricts the geographic movement of raw milk, forcing producers to sell their 
product through local milk collectors even if prices are higher in other markets;  the fear of 
potential substitution by an alternative supplier if they reduce their delivery quota below a 
certain level; and a large proportion of fixed and specific inputs that prevent a low-cost 
reallocation of capital resources in the short run, in addition to cash flow constraints.  
3.7 Conclusions  
The results of the analysis have shown that a long-run single cointegration relationship exists 
between wholesalers’ and producers’ prices; that the direction of price transmission tends to 
go from producers to wholesalers; that a change in producer´s prices do not have a significant 
effect on wholesaler´s  prices in the next period; that the speed at which prices tend to converge 
to fully correct for deviation is moderately slow; and that when producers´ prices increase the 
speed of adjustment tend to be significantly faster, in other words that price transmission is 
asymmetric. These results have serious welfare policy implications, since asymmetric 
transmission of milk prices implies that small dairy producers are not benefiting from price 
changes as much as they would under a more competitive scenario. If market price signals are 
not being efficiently transmitted to producers at the farm gate, it is unlikely that small producers 
will adopt the necessary mechanisms to respond adequately and quickly to changes in the 
market structure.  
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Chapter 4 Combining Industrial Organization and 
Econometric Methods in Price Transmission Analysis 
Abstract  
The degree of competition and level of price transmission in food markets have important 
effects on the welfare level of consumers and producers. Thus, substantial attention has been 
paid to analysis of price transmission in food markets. Traditionally, price transmission 
analyses have focused on applying econometric methods to assess whether prices are 
cointegrated, the order of cointegration and the adjustment speed. In contrast, less attention has 
been devoted to the theoretical underpinnings, the structure of the market and the interpretation 
of results. To address this gap, this study explores how to combine industrial organization 
methods and time-series econometrics in price transmission analyses to inform policy choices. 
The study illustrates the complementarity of these methods in identifying the factors that 
determine the level of price transmission, assessing the price dynamics between producers and 
wholesalers, and linking the empirical results with theory. The study uses the Panama’s milk 
market to illustrate this approach.  
4.1 Introduction  
The degree of competition and the level of price transmission in food markets has important 
effects on the welfare level of consumers and producers (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). Recent 
studies (Dawe et al., 2015; Dawe and Maltsoglou, 2014) stress the importance of deeply 
understanding the price dynamics of food markets in explaining the welfare effects of policy 
measures on food security. Current trends in mergers and acquisitions, coupled with increases 
in industry concentration have captured the attention of policy makers regarding the 
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performance of food markets and the lack of transparency in the transmission of prices 
(McCorriston, 2013). In Panama, articles appeared in various newspapers in 2007 suggesting 
that processors agreed on the price of milk paid to producers, which highlighted the lack of 
transparency in the milk market and motivated the national antitrust authority to open an 
investigation against industrial processors over the alleged use of monopolistic practices. The 
investigation found that four major processors exchanged information that ultimately led them 
to agree on the purchase price of milk paid to producers.  
Substantial attention has been given to analysis of the level of price transmission in food 
markets during recent decades (for reviews see Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; Frey 
and Manera, 2007; Bakucs et al, 2014). Traditionally, price transmission analysis has focused 
on applying econometric methods to assess if prices are co-integrated, the order of 
cointegration and the adjustment speed. However, less attention has been devoted to the 
theoretical underpinnings, the understanding of the market structure, and the interpretation of 
results (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Goodwin and Vavra (2009), in an overview 
of the empirical literature addressing vertical and spatial price transmission, highlight that the 
results of price transmission analysis are not sufficiently informative without a deeper 
understanding of the market structure relevant to the commodity in question. Moreover, Miller 
and Hayenga (2001) note that although economists have proposed many approaches for price 
transmission analyses, the econometric methods often used are limited because they cannot 
identify plausible explanations of price behaviour under competing theories. According to 
Peltzman (2000), an explanation of incomplete price transmission requires a better 
understanding of market linkages. 
Acknowledgement of these issue has stimulated recent studies (Lloyd et al. 2004; Brümmer et 
al., 2009; Ihle et al., 2012; Götz et al., 2013) to incorporate the use of market structure 
information in price transmission analyses. This study takes this approach further by exploring 
how to combine industrial organization (IO) and econometric research methods for price 
transmission analysis to inform policy choices. With this aim, this research uses a three-step 
approach. First, we employ IO methods to analyse the structure of the milk market. Second, 
we use time-series econometrics to analyse the price dynamics, particularly the marketing 
margin, between producers and wholesalers. Finally, we triangulate the different sources of 
information to gain a better understanding of the interrelations among the factors that influence 
the transmission of prices, linking the evidence with theory.  
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4.2 Price transmission analysis  
Price transmission analyses use different modifications of a model introduced by Granger 
(1981) and then extended by Engel and Granger (1987) based on cointegration theory. 
Cointegration theory stipulates that if the linear combination of nonstationary series is 
stationary, then the series are said to be cointegrated (Engel and Granger, 1987). A major aspect 
of cointegrated series is that their dynamics are affected by the degree of deviations from the 
long-run equilibrium relationship (Enders, 1998). 
This implies that a close relationship exists between cointegration and error correction models 
(ECM), as suggested by Granger (1981). ECMs have been widely used in price transmission 
under the idea that a fraction of a disadjustment from one period is corrected in the next period 
(Engel and Granger, 1987). Studies have found that the transmission of food prices tends to be 
nonlinear, rather than linear (Hassouneh et al., 2012); indeed, the nonlinear transmission of 
prices seems to be the rule rather than the exception (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). 
In this regard, much of the research on price transmission has focused on capturing these 
nonlinearities (Kinnucan et al., 1987; Serra and Goodwin, 2002; Awokuse and Wang, 2009: 
Bolotova et al., 2012; McLaren, 2015).  
Following the concept of the non-symmetric ECM introduced by Granger and Lee (1989), von 
Cramon-Taubadel (1998) proposes splitting the error correction term into positive and negative 
components to test for asymmetries in the transmission of prices, depending on whether they 
increase or decrease. As indicated by Abdulai (2000), under the presence of transaction costs, 
movement towards equilibrium does not always occur. Awokuse and Wang (2009) highlight 
that studies that ignore threshold effects in the transmission of prices may be misleading. To 
overcome this problem, studies have applied different modifications of threshold vector error 
correction models (TVECM) as a way to incorporate the effects of transaction costs in price 
transmission analyses, allowing error correction specifications to adequately capture nonlinear 
and threshold-type price adjustments (Goodwin and Holt, 1999; Serra and Goodwin, 2002; 
Balcome et al., 2007 Bekkerman et al., 2013).  
In recent years, regime-dependent vector error correction models (RVECMs) have received 
notable attention in the literature. According to Ihle et al. (2011) the parameters governing price 
interdependence might not be constant, indicating that if this characteristic is disregarded, the 
model will be misspecified. Hassouneh et al. (2010) use a RVECM to assess the impact of 
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bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreaks in the Spanish dairy sector and show that 
the BSE crises affected producer and retailer prices differently. Busse et al. (2012) employ a 
Markov-switching vector error correction model (MS-VECM) to analyse changes in the 
relationship between diesel and biodiesel prices due to changes in market conditions. 
Amikuzuno and von Cramon-Taubadel (2012) apply a modification of the VECM with 
seasonally regime-dependent adjustment parameters, showing that not accounting for 
seasonality can lead to compound estimates of the parameters that indicate price transmission 
behaviour but overlook seasonal differences in the price dynamics.  
4.3 Determinants of price transmission 
A fundamental step in IO research is the need to develop preliminary theoretical propositions 
that make it possible to link the empirical results with theory and draw inferences concerning 
causal relationships among the variables under investigation. Each proposition should focus on 
particular factors to provide relevant evidence during the research study (e.g., Holst and von 
Cramon-Taubadel, 2014). Lloyd et al. (2004), in an analysis of price transmission in 
imperfectly competitive vertical markets, identify the following proposition: “Proposition 1: 
Market power at the retail stage, either in form of oligopoly or oligopsony power, will result in 
a differential impact on farm level prices than on retail prices following an exogenous shift in 
the demand function. With oligopoly power, price transmission from retail to farm prices will 
increase; with oligopsony power, price transmission will decrease” (p.6).  
In food markets, the level of price transmission is related to the shapes of the supply and 
demand curves (Kim and Ward, 2013). Thus, the structure of the market matters in explaining 
the response of prices on one level to shocks in another (Carlton and Perloff, 2004). Standard 
economic theory suggest that the elasticity of price transmission will be equal to one in a 
competitive market, which implies that price changes will be transmitted completely from 
processors to farmers after a shock. In an oligopolistic market, the elasticity of price 
transmission will be higher than one, meaning that the margin between processors and farm 
prices will expand (contract) after a negative (positive) demand shock. In an oligopsony 
market, the elasticity of price transmission will be lower than one, the reason being that the 
margin between processors and farm prices will contract (expand) after a negative (positive) 
shock (Lloyd et al. 2004).  
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The ability of the market structure to transmit price signals up and down through the system is 
a reflection of market performance (Kim and Ward, 2013). Although in price transmission 
analysis, perfect competition has often been understood as having an elasticity that equals one, 
Kinnucan and Zhang (2015) show that this definition is inconsistent and that a competitive 
market does not require the elasticity of price transmission to be one. Indeed, Weldegebriel 
(2004) shows that market power does not necessarily lead to incomplete price transmission. 
Moreover, Peltzman (2000) argues that incomplete price transmission may be a feature of 
competitive, as well as oligopolistic, market structures.  
Bakucs et al. (2014) find that incomplete price transmission is likely to occur in sectors with 
more divided farm structures, higher governmental assistance and more restrictive norms on 
price controls. According to Bolotova and Novakovic (2012) price control rules facilitate 
cooperative conduct of actors acting in an oligopolistic market environment. Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel (2004) highlight that if firms are engaged in unspoken collusion, actors will 
tend to adjust input price increases faster than decreases in order to signal to their competitors 
that collusion will be maintained. Serra and Goodwin (2002) identify that retail prices adjust 
to farm level shocks, but that farm prices respond modestly to retail price shocks, explaining 
that the lack of producers’ organization limit their power to negotiate prices. 
Several authors (Abdulai, 2000; Conforti, 2004; Frey and Manera, 2007; Sanogo and Amadou, 
2010) find that if transaction costs are extremely high, often related to poor infrastructure, 
particularly roads and marketing facilities, changes in prices will be only partially transmitted 
or not transmitted at all. Other studies argue that incomplete price transmission is also related 
to menu costs, frequently called sticky prices, which are often fixed costs, transaction costs and 
adjustment costs associated with increasing or decreasing output prices (Kinnucan and Forker, 
1987; Goodwin and Holt, 1999).  
Policy measures such as import tariffs can also hinder the complete transmission of market 
signals from international to domestic markets, leading to incomplete price adjustments 
(Martin and Anderson, 2012). A tariff import quota reduces the opportunities for spatial 
arbitrage, constraining the transmission of prices from international to domestic markets. 
Exchange rate changes can retard the transmission of prices, mitigating internal trade price 
changes (Baquedano and Liefert, 2014). Intervention mechanisms can also lead to a partial co-
movement of international and domestic prices, where international price changes will be 
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transmitted more or less complete to domestic prices depending on whether they are above or 
below certain price levels (Rapsomanikis et al., 2003).  
Economic theory suggests that the degree of price transmission can be explained by the 
structure of the respective market. The empirical evidence reveals that while in some cases, 
markets are well described by this theory, in others, they are not. The determinants of price 
transmission differ among markets, with the degree of concentration being an important factor, 
but aspects such as menu costs, transaction cost, and trade-policy mechanisms are also 
involved.  
IO research methods appear to be a valuable complementary tool for understanding the 
underlying factors that explain the level of price transmission in food markets, interpreting 
these findings and linking the evidence with theory (Armstrong et al., 2007; Carlton and 
Perloff, 2004). In fact, IO research methods might be of the most benefit when the focus of the 
research is on explaining the “how” or “why”. In this regard, a major strength of IO research 
is its ability to use multiple sources of evidence, including documents, media searches, semi-
structured interviews, focus group discussions and participant observations (Yin, 2013).  
4.4 Methodology  
A fundamental observation made in the empirical literature is that the results derived from price 
transmission analysis are not sufficiently informative without a deeper understanding of the 
market structure (Goodwin and Vavra, 2009). This study address this issues by exploring how 
to combine IO and econometric research methods in price transmission analysis. With this aim, 
this research uses a three-step approach (figure 4.1).  
First, we employ IO methods to analyse the structure of the milk market. Second, we use time-
series econometrics to analyse the price dynamics between producers and wholesalers. Third, 
we triangulate the different sources of information, bring together the evidence derived from 
both analysis, to better understand the interrelations among the factors that influence the 
transmission of prices and link the empirical results with the theoretical propositions. 
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Figure 4.1  Analytical framework 
 
The first step in the IO analysis is to develop theoretical propositions to guide the data 
collection process, inform the design of the econometric model, and allow the study to link the 
empirical results with theory. Departing from the literature review the propositions described 
in table 4.1 were developed. Second we map the supply chain to assess the structure of the 
market, identify the interlinkages between firms and the flow of products. Third, we define the 
specific unit of analysis. Considering that the particular interest of the analysis is to assess the 
level of price transmission between small producers and wholesalers, special attention is given 
to these two units. Fourth, we collect evidence using various qualitative sources of information 
including documentation, newspaper articles, semi-structured interviews and focus group 
discussions (Yin, 2013).  




Proposition 1 The market structure is characterized by  oligopsonistic competition 
Proposition 2 Oligopsonistic power dampens the degree of price transmission 
Proposition 3 Incomplete price transmission is associated with market power. 
Proposition 4 The price spread narrows when markets become more competitive.  
Source: Authors  
 
1. Industrial Organization Analysis 
Develop preliminary 
theoretical propositions.
Map the structure of the      
market.
Define specific units of 
analysis.
Collect evidence using 
market analayis  methods.
2. Time-series Econometric Analysis 
Test for Unit Roots.
Test for structural stability.
Test for cointegration.
Build  VECM with the 
information from the IO.
3. Triangulation 
Bring together the evidence 
derived from both analysis.
Understand the interrelations 
among the factors. 
Link the evidence with the 
theoretical propositions.
Source: Authors  
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Time-series econometric methods are used to analyse the price dynamics between producers 
and wholesalers. A major factor in price analysis is to determine if the series are stationary or 
nonstationary. A standard ADF is use to test for unit roots in both variables while also 
considering the potential presence of structural breaks in the series (Perron, 1989; Saikkonen 
and Lukepohl, 2002; Wang and Tomek, 2007). The unit root test with structural breaks propose 
by Saikkonen and Lutkepohl (2002) is also employed.  
A fundamental assumption of VECMs is that the parameters of the model remain constant 
throughout the sample period.  However, the results of IO analysis suggest that a structural 
change in the milk market might have occurred around January 2006. Thus, we test for 
structural stability using a break point (BP) Chow test (Candelon and Lütkepohl, 2001). Given 
that both series are nonstationary, we employ the Johansen approach to test for cointegration 
(Johansen, 1991). Then, we apply a VECM to assess the price dynamics between the series.  
Considering that our specific interest is to assess the effect of the structural policy change on 
the price spread relationship between producers and wholesalers we specified a VECM (4.1) 
where a policy dummy variable influences the constant term of the cointegration relationship 













The VECM is specify as (4.1), where p  is a vector of producer and wholesaler prices in 
logarithms,  is the loading matrix containing the speed at which the variables adjust to 
deviations from long-run (LR) equilibrium;  represents the cointegrating matrix quantifying 
the prices’ long-term equilibrium relationship; C is a constant term that captures all the 
elements contributing to the price spread associated with the marketing margin between 
producers and wholesalers; cD denotes a structural change dummy variable that takes the value 
of zero from January 1991 to December 2005 and one between January 2006 and December 
2013; , ,1,...,1  pi contains the matrices of short-term parameters to be estimated. Finally, 
we triangulate the different sources of information, bringing together the evidence derived from 
both analysis, in order to improve our understanding of the aspects that affect the complete 
transmission of prices, and link the empirical results with the theoretical propositions. 
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4.5 Data gathering  
The IO analysis was conducted using different sources of information, including a 
competitiveness analysis of the dairy sector, value chain studies, official government reports 
and major national newspapers. Semi-structured interviews with key public and private actors 
related to the dairy chain included retailers (2), milk processors (3) and milk producers (10). 
Focus group discussions (2) occurred with key stakeholders involved in the milk supply chain, 
including the Panamanian Livestock Dairy Institute (IPAGAL) and the Livestock National 
Producers Association (ANAGAN). The time-series  analysis was conducted using 252 
monthly observations of fresh whole milk prices over the period of 1991 (1) to 2013 (12) 
provided by the Agricultural Information System of the Contraloria General de la República 
de Panamá. The data are related to milk prices at the producer level and the wholesale level in 
Panama.  
4.6 Results  
4.6.1 Industrial organization (IO) analysis 
Panama produces around 206 million kg of fluid milk equivalent (FME), imports 112 million 
FME, and exports 22 million FME. Thus, total availability of milk is about 296 million FME. 
The dependency ratio is 38 per cent and the average consumption per capita is 77 litres per 
year. As shown in Figure 4.2, there are about 6 630 milk producers, with 6 per cent producing 
Grade A milk, 4 per cent producing Grade B milk, and 90 per cent producing Grade C milk. 
From the 206 million kg the country produced in 2013, 46 per cent was Grade A, 6 per cent 
was Grade B and 48 per cent was Grade C. Grades A and B are used to supply the domestic 
market with fresh milk, while Grade C is used mainly for industrial purposes, the elaboration 
of traditional cheese and self-consumption at the farm level. From all the domestic supply, 75 
per cent goes to the industry, 15 per cent to traditional processors and the remaining 10 per cent 
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Source: Authors based on data from the Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecaurio (MIDA), 2010; 
Contraloría General de la República de Panamá (CGRP), 2011); Instituto nacional de estadística y censo 
de Panama (INEC), 2014.  
There are six major milk processing companies in the country. In 2013, the three biggest of 
these processors absorbed nearly 80 percent of the supply oriented to the industrial market. 
During the last ten years the dairy processing sector has experienced mergers and 
consolidations; for example, Coca-Cola FEMSA (Fomento Económico Mexicano S.A) from 
Mexico acquired Estrella Azul; the cooperative Dos Pinos from Costa Rica acquired Nevada; 
and the company Casa Luker from Colombia acquired Bonlac. These recent developments have 
led to changes in the structure of the market, not only due to the increase in the size of 
operations, but also because of the type of products they demand.  
Panama has traditionally been a net importer of dairy products. In 2013, the country imported 
112 million kg of FME units with a value of US$104 million. From total imports, in terms of 
value, cheese accounted for 53 per cent, milk powder for 26 per cent, butter for 8 per cent, 
whey for 6 per cent, yogurt for 5 per cent and fluid milk and cream for 3 per cent. The export 
of dairy products from Panama has been relatively low; in 2013 the country exported about 22 
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million kg of FME units with a value of US$11.5 million; of this total 73 per cent was milk 
powder and 27 per cent was cheese. Due to tariff preferences obtained under the free trade 
agreement between Central America and Panama, dairy exports went mainly to Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.  
The visual analysis of the price series in Figure 4.3 shows that between 1991 and 2005 producer 
(PP) and wholesaler (WP) milk prices were relatively stable moving around 25 cents per litre. 
However, the graph also reveals that after 2006, milk prices increased and became more 
volatile indicating that a major change in the structure of the market might have occurred during 
this period.   
Figure 4.3  Producer and wholesaler milk prices 
 
Source: Authors based on price data from the Contraloria General de la República de Panamá CGRP), 
2014. 
The results of the media search (Table 4.2) reveal that around 2006 dairy producers and milk 
industrial processors engaged in a price discussion for the alleged use of monopolistic practices 
by industrial processors. In an article published on January 2006, producers argue that while 
processors increased dairy prices for consumers by between 1 and 10 cents, dairy prices paid 
to producers remained constant at 20 cents per litre (Berrocal, 2006). Thus, producers requested 




























































































































































Producers accused processors of the use of monopolistic practices, requesting the National 
Authority for Consumer Protection (ACODECO) to verify that there was not a price agreement 
among economic actors (Guerra, 2006). Subsequently, producers threatened processors with 
strike action if prices per litre of milk were not increased by 9 cents per litre (Torres, 2007). 
Industrial processors did not meet the producer request (Tapia, 2007) offering a price rise of 3 
cents, instead. Producers accepted the offer but indicated that they were exploring other actions 
to ensure more competitive prices (Tapia, 2007). In March 2008, ACODECO sued four major 
industrial processors for the presumed use of monopolistic practices to fix milk prices paid to 
producers (De Gracia, 2008). 
Table 4.2  Media search timeline results  
Timeline News headlines Newspaper 
12 Jan. 2006 While major dairy processors in Panama increased milk 





12 Oct. 2006 
 
Dairy producers requested industrial processors to adjust 
the prices paid for raw milk at the farm gate level. 
 
La Prensa 
22 Nov. 2006 Producers accused industrial processors of acting as a 




22 May 2007 
 
Producers threatened industrial processors with strike 




 7 Jun. 2007 Producers accepted the price adjustment offered by 
industrial processors, but pointed out that they will explore 




8 Mar. 2008 Four major dairy processors were sued for the alleged use 
of monopolistic practices. 
Panamá  
América 
Source: Authors  
The semi-structured interviews highlighted that articles that appeared in various newspapers 
during 2007 motivated ACODECO to open an investigation against four industrial milk 
processors for presumed collusion. The investigated processors were found guilty of having 
incurred in monopolistic practices. The evidence revealed that they had exchanged information 
that ultimately led to impose the purchase price of raw milk paid to dairy producers.  As a 
result, a fine of hundred thousand dollars was defined for each of the companies involved and 
an audit process established. The interviews also revealed that while the fear of being sued for 
collusion has discouraged the use of absolute monopolistic practices, the lack of an antitrust 
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legislation to address violations against competitive market behaviour has resulted in the use 
of relative monopolistic practices such as the establishment of exclusivity agreements or the 
use of boycotts to limit the capacity of new competitors to enter markets, both of which are 
more difficult to investigate and monitor.   
In the focus group discussions, dairy producers pointed out that in Panama milk prices regularly 
increase during the dry season between January and May, and decrease during the rainy season 
between June and December. Producers also expressed their worries about the performance of 
the milk sector, arguing that price signals were not being transmitted efficiently along the 
supply chain. They identified that some of the factors that might be affecting the level of 
efficiency of the milk market are related to: 
- The presence of a large number of poorly organized dairy producers combined with a small 
number of well-articulated industrial processors, leading to the low bargaining power of 
dairy producers;  
- A perishable product which restricts the geographic movement of raw milk, forcing 
producers to sell their product through local milk collectors even if prices are higher in 
other markets;   
- The fear of potential substitution by an alternative supplier if they reduce their delivery 
quota below a certain level;  
- A large proportion of fixed and specific inputs that prevent a low-cost reallocation of capital 
resources in the short run, in addition to cash flow constraints.  
The semi-structured interviews with industrial processors revealed that in Panama industrial 
milk processors demand fluid milk grade C as input for the production of ice cream and butter. 
The price paid to dairy producers takes into account the grade level of the product, the 
international price of milk powder and the supply production season. Thus, prices go slightly 
up or down depending on whether milk is grade A, B or C, whether the international price is 
above or below domestic price, and whether it is the dry or the rainy season. Most processors 
manage between two and three months of milk powder stock inventories that allow them to 
smooth the transmission of the prices both to producers and retailers.  Stock inventories are 
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usually lower during the dry season and higher during the rainy season. Thus, processors pay 
slightly higher prices to producers during the dry season.  
4.6.2 Time-series econometric analysis  
A standard ADF is use to test for unit roots in both variables; however, considering the potential 
presence of structural breaks in the series the unit root test with structural breaks (URSB) 
proposed by Saikkonen and Lutkepohl (2002) is also employed. Two specifications are 
consider for the ADF test; one includes only an intercept and the other, a trend and intercept. 
As to the URSB test the specification includes a shift, or a shift and a trend.  The optimal 
number of lags are selected using the Schwarz criterion. As reported in Table 4.3, the results 
of the ADF and the URSB test indicate that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of nonstationarity at the five per cent level, confirming the presence of unit roots in 
both producer and wholesaler price series.   
Table 4.3  Unit root tests 
Test Variable Break Lags 0: Ho  0: Ho  t-statistics critical 
values at 5% 
 
ADF LWP - 2 -1.26 -9.27 -2.86 
LPP 
 
- 3 -0.91 -6.38 -2.86 
ADF 
Intercept/trend 
LWP - 2 -2.54 -8.62 -3.41 
LPP 
 
- 3 -3.10 -4.72 -3.41 
URSB 
shift 
LWP 2006 M2 2 -2.54 -10.21 -2.88 
LPP 
 
2006 M1 3 -0.16 -6.93 -2.88 
URSB 
shift/trend 
LWP 2006 M2 2 -2.68 -10.22 -3.03 
LPP 2007 M12 3 -2.33 -7.00 -3.03 
Source: Authors  
The previous unit roots test indicated that both series are nonstationary and the results of the 
media search suggested the potential presence of a structural break. A Johansen cointegration 
test with and without structural breaks is employ to investigate the number of cointegration 
relations between the series. The results of both tests presented in Table 4.4, highlight the 
existence of a long-run cointegration relationship between the series, indicating that wholesaler 
and producer variables are cointegrated. 
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Table 4.4  Cointegration tests  
Test Variable Break Lags Ro LR P-value t-statistics critical 
values at 5% 
Johansen LWP 
 3 
















0 29.32 0.008 24.76 
LPP 1 8.66 0.220 12.73 
Source: Authors  
Taking into account the structural market change highlighted by the media search, the next step 
in the analysis involved checking the potential presence of a structural break in the series during 
the sample period. A BP Chow test was employed to check the parameters’ constancy 
throughout the sample. The BP Chow tests and their respective bootstrap p-values are reported 
in Table 4.5. The BP Chow tests confirm the presence of a structural break in the model around 
January 2006.  
Table 4.5  Chow tests for structural break    









BP Chow test 
 
310.8673 0.00 0.00 
Sample split Chow test  13.3935 0.09 0.09 
Note: Bootstrap p-values based on 100 replications; sample period 1991 M3 to 2013 M12. 
To assess the price dynamics between producers and wholesalers a VECM is estimated 
(equation 4.1). The model is built taking into account the previous results from the IO analysis 
which highlighted that a major structural change might have occurred in the milk market 
around January 2006. Thus the VECM is fitted incorporating into the cointegration matrix a 
constant term to capture the price spread level between producers and wholesalers, a policy 
change dummy variable to capture the structural change in the market. 
The results of the VECM model (Table 4.6) indicate that a change in wholesale prices does not 
have an effect on producer prices in the short run. However, the long-run coefficient shows 
that a change of 1 per cent in the wholesaler price leads to a change of 0.45 per cent in 
producer’s price in the long-run. The loading coefficient highlights that producer and 




Table 4.6  VECM Parameter Estimates  
Long-run relationship  ?̂̂?2 −0.45
∗∗∗ 
 
  (0.13) 
PP speed of adjustment ?̂?1 −0.23
∗∗∗  
  (0.04) 
WP speed of adjustment  ?̂?2 0.16
∗∗∗  
  (0.05) 
Price spread  ?̂? −1.71∗∗∗  
  (0.44) 
Structural change dummy 𝛿 −0.30∗∗∗  
  (0.08) 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. *** denote statistical significance at the 1 per cent level; 
** denote statistical significance at the 5 per cent level; * denote statistical significance at the 10 per 
cent level. 
Given that the deterministic variables, namely, the constant and the policy change dummy 
variable, are in logs, in order to interpret them we took the anti-log of those values. In this 
regard, the exponential value of the constant (-1.71) indicate that the price spread (marketing 
margin) between wholesaler and producer prices is approximately 18 per cent of the producer’s 
price. Furthermore, the exponential value of the policy change dummy (-0.30) indicates that 
this price spread was reduced to 13 per cent after the policy change.  
4.6.3  Methodological Triangulation 
The results derived from each methodology, the industrial organization and time-series 
econometrics, are combined in order to deeper understand how the structure of markets and 
behaviour of agents are affecting the level of PT in the milk market (Table 4.7). The results of 
the market structure analysis confirm the first proposition, highlighting that in Panama the milk 
market is characterized by an oligopsonistic structure constituted by six major processors and 
more than 6000 producers.  
The results of the VECM long-term parameter confirm our second proposition, indicating that 
in the long-run a change of 1 per cent in the wholesale price leads to a change of 0.45 per cent 
in the producer’s price. The results of the semi-structured interviews with the national antitrust 
authority corroborate our third proposition, highlighting that four processors where found 
guilty of having incurred in collusion practices to fix the price of milk paid to producers. The 
VECM policy change dummy variable confirm our four proposition, showing that after 
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antitrust regulations were imposed the price spread between wholesalers and producers 
decreased from 18 per cent to 13 per cent.  
Table 4.7  Methodological Triangulation   
  
Finally, the results of the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions corroborate 
our four propositions, highlighting that the combination of a high level of market concentration 
at the industry level with an inelastic price supply function at the producer level has allowed 
market power to emerge and affect the level of price transmission. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This study explores how to combine the use of industrial organization and econometric 
methods for price transmission analysis. With this aim, the research uses a three-step approach. 
First, we employ industrial organization methods to analyse the structure of the milk market; 
second, we use a time-series econometric methods to assess the price dynamics, in particular 
the marketing margin, between producers and wholesalers, and finally, we triangulate the 
different methods to better understand the interrelations among the factors that influence the 
transmission of prices, and link the evidence with the theory. Based on the literature review the 
analytical framework is guided by the following four propositions: (1) the milk market structure 
is characterized by oligopsonistic competition; (2) oligopsonistic power dampens the degree of 
price transmission; (3) incomplete price transmission is associated with market power; (4) the price 
spread narrows when markets become more competitive. 
Proposition Method Evidence 
1. The market structure is characterized 
by  oligopsonistic competition 
IO Four major processors absorb 90% of 
domestic milk supply 
2. Oligopsonistic power dampens the 
degree of PT  
VECM A change of 1% in WP prices leads to 
a change of 0.45% in PP. 
3. Incomplete level of PT is associated 
with the exertion of market power. 
IO ACODECO found four processors 
guilty of collusion.  
4. Price spread narrows when markets 
become more competitive. 
VECM After antitrust regulations were 
enforced the price spread decreased 
from 18% to 13%. 
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The results of the VECM long-term parameter confirm our second proposition, indicating that 
in the long-run a change of 1 per cent in the wholesale price leads to a change of 0.45 per cent 
in the producer’s price. The results of the semi-structured interviews with the national antitrust 
authority corroborate our third proposition, highlighting that four processors where found 
guilty of having incurred in collusion practices to fix the price of milk paid to producers. The 
VECM policy change dummy variable confirm our four proposition, showing that after 
antitrust regulations were imposed the price spread between wholesalers and producers 
decreased from 18 per cent to 13 per cent. Finally, the results of the semi-structured interviews 
and focus group discussions corroborate our four propositions, highlighting that the 
combination of a high level of market concentration at the industry level with an inelastic price 
supply function at the producer level has allowed market power to emerge and affect the level 
of price transmission. 
A major strength of this approach is its ability to use multiple sources of evidence including 
documents, media searches, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and 
econometric analysis to better understand the structure of the market and draw inferences 
concerning price dynamics. The main challenges identified was the difficulty of generalize the 
results obtained from focus group discussions and the semi-structured interviews. 
Nevertheless, the process also revealed that results could be generalized to theoretical 
propositions. The study has illustrated the complementarity of these methods to better 
understand the findings, to corroborate theoretical propositions and to advance theoretical 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions   
In recent decades, substantial attention has been given to analysis of the level of price 
transmission in food markets (for reviews see Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; Frey 
and Manera, 2007; Bakucs et al., 2014). Traditionally, price transmission analysis has been 
focused on applying econometric methods to assess if prices are co-integrated, the order of 
cointegration and the adjustment speed. However, less attention has been devoted to the 
theoretical underpinnings, the understanding of the market structure, and the interpretation of 
results (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Goodwin and Vavra (2009) in an overview 
of the empirical literature that has addressed vertical and spatial price transmission, highlight 
that the results of price transmission analysis are not sufficiently informative without a deeper 
understanding of the market structure relevant to the commodity in question.  
Acknowledgment of this issue has stimulated recent studies (Lloyd et al., 2004; Brümmer et 
al., 2009; Ihle et al., 2012; Götz et al., 2013) to incorporate the use of market structure 
information in price transmission analyses. This study takes this approach further by exploring 
how to combine industrial organization (IO) and econometric research methods for price 
transmission analysis. In the process of testing this approach, the study employs the following: 
IO to understand the structure of the market and derive preliminary theoretical propositions; 
time-series econometric methods to assess the spatial and vertical level of price transmission 
and test the propositions; and triangulation methods to interpret the evidence, linking the 
empirical results with the propositions. The study uses the Panama’s milk market to illustrate 
this approach.   
The first step of the analysis found that Panama’s milk market is characterized by an 
oligopsonistic market structure constituted by a small number of processors and a large number 
of small producers. The semi-structured interviews with importers reveal that milk powder is 
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imported using an auction system open exclusively to those processors holding an import 
licence. The quota is divided into two main parts: the first part, equivalent to 70 per cent of the 
quota, is negotiated in November, but physically imported in January during the dry season; 
the second part, equivalent to 30 per cent of the quota, is negotiated in May and internalized in 
July during the peak production season. However, if the international price is higher than the 
domestic price during the first term of the year, processors can request the government to 
allocate the full quota to the second term.  
The focus group discussions with producers identify some factors that might affect the milk 
market’s level of efficiency: the presence of a large number of poorly organized dairy producers 
combined with a small number of well-articulated industrial processors, leading to the low 
bargaining power of dairy producers; a perishable product which restricts the geographic 
movement of raw milk, forcing producers to sell their product through local milk collectors 
even if prices are higher in other markets;  the fear of potential substitution by an alternative 
supplier if they reduce their delivery quota below a certain level; and a large proportion of fixed 
and specific inputs that prevent a low-cost reallocation of capital resources in the short run, in 
addition to cash flow constraints.  
The results of the media search reveal that dairy producers and milk industrial processors 
engaged in a price discussion related to the alleged use of monopolistic practices by industrial 
processors. The semi-structured interviews with the national antitrust authority (ACODECO) 
highlight engagement in monopolistic practices by major processors, whereby they agreed a 
price to be paid at farm gate level. The semi-structured interviews with industrial processors 
revealed that in Panama most processors manage between two and three months of milk 
powder stock inventories that allow them to smooth the transmission of the prices both to 
producers and retailers.  Stock inventories are usually lower during the dry season and higher 
during the rainy season. Thus, processors pay slightly higher prices to producers during the dry 
season.  
Second, we employ an error correction model (ECM), an asymmetric error correction models 
(AECM), and a vector error correction model (VECM) to assess the price dynamics between 
global and domestic markets, as well as along the supply chain. The output of the ECM shows 
the existence of a long-run equilibrium between global and domestic milk prices; however, it 
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also indicates that prices changes in the global market are buffered in the domestic market. The 
results of the AECM reveal that the transmission of milk prices between producers and 
wholesalers is asymmetric with respect to the speed of adjustment indicating that when 
producers’ prices increase, the speed of adjustment tends to be significantly faster, but when 
prices decrease, there are no statistically significant changes in the speed of adjustment. Finally, 
the results of the VECM indicates that a change of  1 per cent  in the wholesale prices leads to 
a change of 4.5 per cent  in the producer’s price, and following the policy change in 2007, the 
price spread between wholesalers and producers decreased from 18 per cent  to 13 per cent . 
Third, we triangulated the different sources of information. The results indicate that the import 
quota mechanism obstruct a more complete transmission of price signals from international to 
domestic markets, suggesting that changes in producers’ milk prices in Panama are driven more 
by domestic rather than international conditions. The presence of a large number of poorly 
organized dairy producers combined with a high level of market concentration at the industry 
level, alongside an inelastic price supply function at the producer level has allowed market 
power to emerge and affect a more complete and symmetric transmission of prices between 
producers and wholesalers, implying that small dairy producers are not benefiting from price 
changes as much as they would under a more competitive scenario. The implementation of 
policy measures to control the monopolistic behaviours of actors has led to improvements in 
the level of market performance by reducing the price spread margin between producers and 
wholesalers. Finally, the results point out the potential role of stock inventories in smoothing 
the transmission of prices from wholesalers to producers as an area for further research.   
The econometric and IO methods used here could be extended in several directions; for 
example, Hassouneh et al. (2012) have pointed out that future research is needed to better 
capture the nonlinear behaviour of price transmission processes. In this regard, the use of 
TVECM would be useful to assess the level of price transmission when milk powder stocks 
are below or above a certain threshold. Given that milk prices regularly increase during the dry 
season and decrease during the rainy season, following Amikuzuno and von Cramon-Taubadel 
(2012), model specifications could also be applied to capture the effects of seasonality in the 
speed of adjustment. One of the main challenges identified during analysis was the difficulty 
of generalizing from the results obtained from the focus group discussions and the semi-
structured interviews. Nevertheless, the analysis also revealed that results could be generalized 
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to theoretical propositions. In this regard, future research may usefully focus on fewer 
propositions, narrowing the research question to one determinant factor, for example, imperfect 
competition, where one might try to better understand “how” and “why” that factor is 
constraining the transmission of prices. Future research might also place more emphasis on 
analysis and discussion of major rival explanations in order to strengthen the external validity 
of results. 
This study has shown how to combine the use of IO and econometric research methods for 
price transmission analysis. With this aim, the research used a three-step approach. First, we 
employed IO methods to analyse the structure of the milk market; second, we used a VECM to 
assess the level of price transmission between producers and wholesalers; and finally, we 
triangulated the different sources of information bringing together the evidence derived from 
both analyses in order to better understand interrelations among the factors that influence the 
level of price transmission. A major strength of this approach is its ability to use multiple 
sources of evidence including documents, media searches, semi-structured interviews, focus 
group discussions and econometric analysis to better understand the structure of the market and 
draw inferences concerning price dynamics. However, a weakness is the difficulty of 
generalizing from the results obtained from the focus group discussions and the semi-structured 
interviews. The study illustrate the complementarity of these methods to better understand the 
findings, to corroborate theoretical propositions and to advance theoretical concepts thereby 
adding to existing theoretical insights on how these factors might be interrelated. The 
framework presented provides a base to motivate future research studies which will continue 
to explore how a combination of econometric and IO methods can strengthen the use of price 
transmission analysis for policy purposes.  
Looking backward, I see my research as an evolving process, which moves from the application 
of econometric methods to assess the level of price transmission to the use of IO methods to 
better understand the market structure and the underlying causes of incomplete price 
transmission. Although interest in combining the use of econometric and IO methods remains 
the same, emphasis of the analysis is shifting. Thus, despite the title of my research highlighting 
the use of IO methods for price transmission analysis, the results show that there is still a wide 
range of methods that could be applied to strengthen the IO part of the analysis for example 
estimating supply and demand elasticities, relating the level of price transmission to these 
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parameters. However this is precisely the point where my research is at this moment, and the 
direction in which is moving.  
When I started my research, I struggled to provide some economic and policy interpretations 
of the econometric model results. Interestingly, during the process I came across qualitative 
information that highlighted reasons for the incomplete level of price transmission. However, 
as indicated by an anonymous referee, the qualitative information I presented in my first paper 
lacked validity since my research methods did not consider a process to collect, analyse and 
present it. In recognition of the difficulties, of the methodological approaches used to identify 
and analyse the potential underlying causes of the results, I started searching for an approach 
that would allow price transmission analysis that makes better use of qualitative information.   
In this context, my research started by combining the use of quantitative and qualitative 
methods in a sequential approach; first applying econometric methods to assess the price 
dynamics and then qualitative methods to interpret the results. During discussions, it became 
apparent that it could be more useful to employ a simultaneous approach, whereby the results 
derived from each step could be used to inform the other. Thus I incorporated as a third step a 
“methodological triangulation” step, whereby the information derived from the qualitative 
analysis is use to fine-tune the econometric model, and the information derived from the 
econometric model is used to sharpen the qualitative research. A major methodological 
challenge I found during that phase of my research was the generalization of the qualitative 
findings to draw inferences.  
To address this challenge, I substituted qualitative methods with IO methods. In my research 
approach, the IO analysis departs from the construction of “theoretical propositions” to allow 
the study to link the empirical results with theory. During discussions it became apparent that 
the research challenge was not only to identify the potential causes of incomplete price 
transmission, but also to identify theoretical propositions to be tested using econometric 
methods. Thus, following recent studies (Yin, 2015), I modified the previous analytical 
approach by applying econometrics methods to assess the price dynamics and qualitative 
methods to explain the causes of those dynamics,  employing IO methods to demonstrate if the 
empirical results support or challenge the theory. 
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Looking forward, the next phase of my research will be to strengthen and consolidate the 
triangulation phase of the process. IO methods will be used to develop “theoretical 
propositions”, to gain a better understanding of the market structure, and to provide information 
to build the econometric model; and econometric methods will assess the price dynamics and 
test the theoretical propositions. If the results support the theoretical propositions, then the 
study should explore if the evidence can be generalized to other situations, if not then it should 
discuss the potential causes and propose rival theoretical explanations.  
Future research in this field could focus on strengthening the linkage between price 
transmission and economic theory. Standard economic theory suggests that the elasticity of 
price transmission will tend to be close to one in a competitive market, higher than one in an 
oligopolistic market, and lower than one in an oligopsonistic market. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that while in some cases price transmission results are well explained by this 
theory, in others they are not. In this regard, a valuable contribution that coming research could 
bring to the academic debate, is a well-explained chapter that clearly links price adjustment 
theory with price transmission analysis. This process will require extensions to the existing 
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